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[NOTE: This isn’t quite a draft yet – it’s a concept paper. You’ll see after the first 
10 pages a good bit of text in brackets, which are primarily notes for me, but it’ll 
give you a sense of the content of those sections. I’d like to talk through the concept 
– the “duty” to mitigate emotional distress damages and how courts have 
struggled with it, as a foray into a broader dichotomy that I see in a number of 
areas of law that suggest an implicit value in “cognitive liberty.” This is a smaller 
version of a broader book project “On Cognitive Liberty” that I’m writing, but I’d 
like to talk through how I might structure this as a standalone article. Forgive its 
brevity and incompleteness, but it’s a great time for me to workshop the concept 
with you.] 
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INTRODUCTION 
Rape kits do not yet include propranolol but they soon may. 
Propranolol, a beta-blocker drug developed in the 1960s as a treatment for 
high blood pressure, could blunt or even altogether extinguish the fear and 
emotional memory of a recent rape.1 Without propranolol, when the victim 
presents in the emergency room just hours after her assault, her physician 
cannot then predict if she will become one of the one third of rape victims 
who will develop post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). If she does 
develop PTSD, then even years later, the smallest trigger—a sound, the 
refrain of a song, a smell—could recall for her in full force the anguish of 
her attack, “as if it were yesterday.” While the physician cannot initially 
predict her likelihood of future psychological trauma—he can know that her 
memories of the attack, just like all newly formed memories, are extremely 
fragile.2 So fragile that if the physician could somehow alter her brain 
activity then and there, she might never form the long-term fear memory 
associated with her assault.3  
Propranolol may offer precisely that. If the physician administers 
propranolol to her in those early hours after her assault, her memory of that 
horrific experience may soon fade, so much so that she might come to 
observe that terrible day as just another day long passed. This may sound 
like a medical miracle—and it very well may be—but with those prospects, 
would anyone reasonably refuse the drug? The answer to that question 
brings daylight to an increasingly critical issue in society—the role of 
cognitive liberty in our law and lives.  
Most people would agree that society should allow or perhaps even 
enable a rape victim to have the choice to mitigate the lasting psychological 
trauma of her assault. But how should the legal system regard a decision by 
her to refuse the drug? Had she been stabbed during a robbery instead of 
being raped, we would consider it perverse for her to refuse medical 
treatment of her wounds. And in a tort suit against the robber, a judge or 
jury would limit her damages because of her negligent treatment of her own 
injuries. Is her refusal to take propranol analogous? Or is there some value 
to remembering her attack more clearly? Could, for example, altering her 
memory render her an ineffective witness in the prosecution of the crime? 
Perhaps the police could take her statement the moment before she ingests 
                                                
1 Cassandra Willyard, Remembered for Forgetting, 18 Nature 482, 483 (2012). 
2 Cristina M. Alberini, Long-term Memories: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, Cerebrum 3 
(October 2010). 
3 Cristina M. Alberini, Long-term Memories: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, Cerebrum 3 
(October 2010) (“Memory consolidation requires the activation of molecular and cellular 
pathways, including those involved in stress, cell survival, cell-to-cell communication, and 
the release of several neurotransmitters (chemicals released in the brain to transmit signals 
across cells.”) 
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propranolol. But would the use of her statement, which she has later 
partially forgotten, violate the alleged perpetrator’s constitutional right to 
confront witnesses against him? Moreover, would she be better off 
remembering and then transcending her assault? Writers, public figures, 
artists and more speak openly about how overcoming a pivotal adversity in 
their lives has enabled them to reach a new consciousness, to gain new 
insight, or to achieve new courage. Do these stories of transcendence 
impact how the law should consider her refusal? Moreover, could blunting 
her suffering have the paradoxical effect of diminishing societal outrage to 
and condemnation of rape?  
This article begins with a deceptively simple principle of tort law: A 
victim of tortious wrongdoing by another is held responsible for averting 
the aggravation of her own injuries. This article addresses whether that 
same doctrine requires a tort victim to likewise mitigate her emotional 
distress injuries. The answer to that question is of great and increasing 
importance because it goes to the heart of how society should address the 
dramatic advances neuroscience that enable us to change our own brains. 
Already new discoveries in neuroscience enable us to selectively 
remember or forget past experiences by erasing parts or entire memories 
from our brains. With the advent of selective forgetting, rape victims, car 
accident victims, burn victims and more may soon have to choose whether 
to numb their memories--or have their civil damages reduced for failing to 
mitigate their own suffering. This prospect poses a deep puzzle that tort law 
and tort theory are ill-equipped to solve. Courts and commentators have 
almost entirely ignored the increasingly crucial issue of whether the 
doctrine of avoidable consequences requires a civil plaintiff to mitigate her 
own pain and suffering. This doctrine, often called the “duty to mitigate,” 
requires that an individual injured by the tortious acts of another exercise 
ordinary care under the circumstances to prevent the aggravation of her 
injuries.4 Courts and commentators all agree that a plaintiff must take 
reasonable steps to mitigate their ordinary physical injuries. But they 
remain utterly perplexed about whether or to what extent a plaintiff must 
similarly mitigate their pain and suffering.  
Pain and suffering are the “invisible” injuries that a person suffers—the 
fright, anxiety, shock, humiliation, indignity, terror, or loss of enjoyment of 
life that a tort victim suffers because of the civil wrongdoing of another.5  
While no sum of money can ever restore the peace of mind disturbed by 
physical injury to the body or humiliation endured, these compensatory 
                                                
4 Avoidable Consequences in Disability Insurance, Newark L. Rev. 8, 9-10. 
5 See e.g., Capelouto v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 500 P.2d 880, 883 (Cal. 1972) (describing pain 
and suffering as encompassing “fright, nervousness, grief, anxiety, worry, mortification, 
shock, humiliation, indignity, embarrassment, apprehension, terror or ordeal); Lars Noah, 
Comfortable Numb: Medicalizing (and Mitigation) Pain-and-Suffering Damages, 42 
U.Mich. J.L. Reform 431 (2009). 
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damages “give to the injured person some pecuniary return for what he has 
suffered or is likely to suffer.”6   These damages also reflect societal 
“disapproval of the harm caused by the tortfeasor,” and “promote loss 
avoidance goals [of the tort system] by sending a fuller deterrent signal.”7  
Scholars recognize the pivotal role that the doctrine of avoidable 
consequences plays in the award of damages for ordinary physical injuries,8 
but have remained practically silent about its relevance in the mitigation of 
“invisible” emotional damages. Perhaps they don’t see a distinction 
between ordinary physical injuries and the invisible ones of pain and 
suffering. Or, perhaps they have approached it as a purely legal matter, 
without considering or understanding the broader scientific and 
philosophical context, and the deep ethical issues that underlie the divide. 
To date only one student note on the issue, plus a couple of law review 
articles considering the law and economic issues implicated have addressed 
the divide. Those articles overlook entirely the role of cognitive liberty in 
the discussion. A few pages of another article makes mention of emerging 
memory-dampening techniques, but doesn’t offer any conclusions with 
respect to emotional distress damages. 
Or, perhaps it has escaped scholarly attention because so few legal 
cases have squarely addressed the concern. Courts that have considered 
what measures, if any, a plaintiff must take to mitigate her own pain and 
suffering express deep ambivalence about the issue.9 In the several cases 
that have found a duty to mitigate emotional distress damages, they have 
stopped short of finding the measures an individual employed to be 
insufficient to have satisfied that duty.10 Other courts have intuited that 
something more is at stake—and have invoked concepts like self-
determination and autonomy as reasons that the doctrine of avoidable 
consequences may not apply to pain and suffering.11 
Courts and scholars have not developed a satisfactory theoretical 
answer to the general question of mitigating ordinary pain and suffering. 
Advances like propranolol that offer a simple way to mitigate invisible 
injuries arising from emotional suffering—by literally changing one’s 
brain—pose a theoretical riddle several layers deeper. They require us to 
decide the boundaries of cognitive liberty and its implication for other areas 
                                                
6 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 903 cmt. a.; see also McDougald v. Garber, 536 N.E2d 
372, 374-75 (N.Y. 1989) (“recovery for noneconomic losses such as pain and suffering and 
loss of enjoyment of life rest on the legal fiction that money damages can compensate for a 
victim’s injury . . . We accept this fiction, knowing that although money will neither ease the 
pain nor restore the victim’s abilities, this devise is as close as the law can come in its effort 
to right the wrong.”). 
7 Lars Noah, 42 Univ. of Mich. J. of L. Reform 431, 449 (2009). 
8 String Cite 
9  
10 Stringcite 
11 cite 
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of law such as whether choosing to forego memory mitigation should lessen 
recoverable damages in tort law. 
The time has come for a systematic and thoroughgoing inquiry. Modern 
neuroscience and medicine have heralded stunning advances in our 
understanding of and ability to change the human experience—with 
meditation, psychotherapy, electrical stimulation, drugs, and more. These 
advances may enable individuals to understand—and to change—their 
conscious and subconscious experiences. Yet we have made almost no 
progress on deciding whether our legal regimes will encourage, or even 
oblige, individuals to alter their brains in such ways lest they be deemed to 
have wrongfully failed to lessen their own suffering. 
The answer to this question bears on far more than just a legal rule 
governing the apportionment of damages in civil suits. It implicates an 
interest that is distinct from “liberty” in the ordinary sense, an interest that 
is only dimly recognized in the cases and the scholarship, an interest that is 
increasingly implicated by dramatic advances in modern science.  This is an 
interest in “cognitive liberty.” This value appears (although often obliquely) 
throughout many modern legal debates. Consider, for example, current 
controversies about whether an employer can require as a condition of 
employment that employees provide their passwords to social media 
accounts which they store mentally but not in any other physical medium. 
Do employees have an interest in cognitive liberty to contractually barter 
with employers about such requirements? Or the doctrine of absolute 
judicial deliberative privilege, which protects the deliberative process a 
judge uses in decision-making from discovery by others. What is the source 
of this common-law tradition, and can it survive developments in modern 
neuroscience? What about the forcible medication of prisoners who lack 
competency to stand trial? Are there contexts in which their cognitive 
liberty trumps societal interests in bringing those individuals to justice? 
And what if the victim of a sexual assault provides a statement to the police 
and then dampens her memory. Can her statement be used in a criminal 
case against the perpetrator without running afoul of his rights under the 
Confrontation Clause of the U.S. Constitution? 
Although this article focuses specifically on the legal obligations 
concerning mitigation of emotional pain and suffering, it also provides a 
critical foray into a much wider theoretical issue—the role of cognitive 
liberty in our legal system and in our society. Part I puts the concern in 
context, explaining the extraordinary advances in modern medicine and 
neuroscience that enable us to quite literally change our minds. Part II 
explains the normative underpinnings of the avoidable consequences 
doctrine, and how its application to these novel treatments shines light on 
the role of cognitive liberty in society. Part III applies these insights to how 
we should address novel therapies in emotional distress damages. Finally, 
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Part IV introduces the broader concept of cognitive liberty and its 
implications for modern legal debates. 
I. CHANGING YOUR “MIND” 
 Do you remember where you were on September 11, 2001? Can you 
recall in vivid detail the events of that day, the emotions you experienced, 
the people you were with, and who you called first? Across the world many 
individuals remember the excruciating details of the 9/11 attacks even more 
strongly than they can remember what they ate for breakfast this morning or 
where they parked their car. This is because traumatic memories tend to be 
the strongest memories.12 The emotional content of a memory enhances the 
strength with which the memory is stored in the brain, and the degree to 
which it can be modified by intervention.13 Because they are so strongly 
encoded, traumatic memories often haunt the victim of the traumatic 
experience by being evoked by environmental stimuli weeks, months and 
even years after the event, leading to secondary effects of anxiety, stress, 
and sometimes post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).14 
Just a few decades ago neuroscientists believed that by adulthood our 
brains are static and unchangeable. The common wisdom held that our adult 
brains are fixed and immutable.15 By the 1970s, new research dramatically 
changed our understanding of the human brain. We now understand that the 
brain is plastic and changeable. And that the information such as memories 
stored therein change and are changeable over time.  
Memories do not immediately become permanent upon experiencing 
events in the world.16 Newly formed memories remain fragile as they are 
                                                
12 Dean G. Kilpatrick, Rape-Related PTSD: Issues and Interventions, 25 Psychiatric Times 
50 (June 20, 2007) (The emotional charge of traumatic events cause the body to release 
stress hormones such as adrenaline or epinephrine, which may enhance memory 
consolidation and the strength of the memory itself. Because of the mechanism by which 
such memories are stored and the strength of their consolidation, pharmacological 
interventions that block the effect of stress hormones such as b-adrenergic antagonists like 
propranolol may reduce the strength or stability of these memories.) 
13 Cristina M. Alberini, Long-term Memories: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, Cerebrum 6 
(October 2010). 
14 Cristina M. Alberini, Long-term Memories: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, Cerebrum 7 
(October 2010) (“Recent studies report that 8 percent of Americans suffer from PTSD and 
about 15 percent of veterans experience multiple or all PTSD symptoms after returning from 
combat.”14 These conditions are often intractable, with only 20 to 30 percent of patients ever 
achieving full remission from the disorder.”) 
15 Meghan O’Rourke, Train Your Brain: The New Mania for Neuroplasticity, Slate, April 
25, 2007, http://www.slate.com/articles/life/brains/2007/04/train_your_brain.html (last 
accessed February 28, 2013). 
16  Yutaka Matsuoka, Clearance of Fear Memory From the Hippocampus Through 
Neurogenesis By Omega-3 Fatty Acids: A Novel Preventive Strategy For Posttraumatic 
Stress Disorder?, 5 BioPsychoSocial Medicine 1, 2 (2011), available at 
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initially being stored in the brain. 17  A computer, for example, stores 
information in random-access-memory (RAM) until a more stable copy is 
stored in erasable and programmable read-only memory of flash memory, 
systems that retains the contents of stored information even when the power 
to a computer is turned off. Similarly, the hippocampus in the brain can 
process and temporarily store a new memory before that memory is 
transferred and consolidated for long-term stored in the cortex of the 
brain.18  Particularly during this initial window of time that the memory is 
first in the brain’s “RAM” and has yet not been consolidated, it remains 
quite fragile.19 As the brain moves the memory from short-term to long-
term storage, it synthesizes new proteins that strengthen the connections 
between neurons. After a day or two, the event has been etched into our 
minds.20  As a result, each time we recall an experience, it comes out of 
long-term storage and goes back into the short-term cache. From there, the 
memory is reconsolidated into long-term storage.  
During the fragile period of memory consolidation, if brain activity is 
tampered with (such as through drug administration) then a long-term 
memory of the event might never form.21 A drug such as propranolol (long 
used as a first-line drug therapy for cardiovascular care) may do precisely 
that by preventing noradrenaline from binding to its receptors in the 
amygdala. Several studies, for example, have confirmed that administering 
propranolol within six hours of a traumatic event substantially reduced 
post-traumatic stress disorder experienced by trauma victims.22 But even 
simple visuospatial tasks if performed during the critical period after a 
trauma can reduce the visual flashbacks that arise after exposure to 
                                                                                                             
http://www.bpsmedicine.com/content/pdf/1751-0759-5-3.pdf (last accessed October 11, 
2011). 
17 Cristina M. Alberini, Long-term Memories: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, Cerebrum 3 
(October 2010). 
18  18  Yutaka Matsuoka, Clearance of Fear Memory From the Hippocampus Through 
Neurogenesis By Omega-3 Fatty Acids: A Novel Preventive Strategy For Posttraumatic 
Stress Disorder?, 5 BioPsychoSocial Medicine 1, 2 (2011), available at 
http://www.bpsmedicine.com/content/pdf/1751-0759-5-3.pdf (last accessed October 11, 
2011). 
19 Cassandra Willyard, Remembered for Forgetting, 18 Nature 482, 483 (April 2012). 
20 Cassandra Willyard, Remembered for Forgetting, 18 Nature 482, 482 (April 2012). 
21 Cristina M. Alberini, Long-term Memories: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, Cerebrum 3 
(October 2010) (“Memory consolidation requires the activation of molecular and cellular 
pathways, including those involved in stress, cell survival, cell-to-cell communication, and 
the release of several neurotransmitters (chemicals released in the brain to transmit signals 
across cells.”) 
22 Dean G. Kilpatrick, Rape-Related PTSD: Issues and Interventions, 25 Psychiatric Times 
50 (June 20, 2007)  (In a randomized placebo-controlled 10-day trial of propranolol 
beginning 6 hours after a traumatic event, 30% in the placebo group and 18% in the 
propranolol group developed PTSD. A subsequent nonrandomized controlled trial of 
propranolol with survivors of motor vehicle accidents or victims of physical assault yielded 
similar results).  
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upsetting trauma. 23  One research team has shown that playing the 
videogame Tetris (a simple visuospatial task) substantially reduces the 
flashback symptoms of PTSD when played continuously up to 4 hours post-
trauma.24  
 With these novel interventions, we could choose to blunt ourselves 
from the emotional pain and suffering that accompanies the recall of 
traumatic experiences. This could be done in anticipation of a traumatic 
event—for example military personnel safeguarding their minds from the 
trauma witnessed daily on the battlefield—or after experiencing a traumatic 
event—such as a victim of sexual or other physical assault seeking to avoid 
recalling the trauma she endured.  
 Earlier memory modification techniques posed less significant 
quandaries than those of today. Electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) has long 
been used to impair the memory of patients.25 Entire memories from the 
days and weeks prior to ECT have been permanently degraded.26 And 
earlier drug interventions have been used to dampen or extinguish entire 
memories. The ingestion of alcohol and other mind-altering substances, for 
example, can cause blackouts that prevent conscious awareness and the 
formation of memories of experiences. These wholesale memory 
modification techniques bear on the broader value of cognitive liberty. But 
brain interventions of today are importantly different. They offer the 
possibility of selective forgetting, by disassociating the pain and suffering 
from the factual content of the experience itself. The fear and emotional 
memory of a traumatic event could be extinguished while the semantic or 
factual content is preserved.27  
 Consider, by contrast, the plot of the fictional movie Eternal Sunshine 
of the Spotless Mind. Actors Jim Carey and Kate Winslet play characters 
that initially to the audience to be two strangers on a train, inexplicably but 
immediately drawn to one another. We soon realize something is deeply 
amiss. Somehow, these two have forgotten entirely their shared and 
recently ended two-year romantic relationship. How can this be? How can 
two people be intimately intertwined for years, and yet now fail to 
recognize one another? The fictional company Lacuna, Incorporated, is to 
blame. To avoid the emotional trauma of a broken heart, they have each 
                                                
23 E.A. Holmes et al., Key Steps In Developing a Cognitive Vaccine Against Traumatic 
Flashbacks: Visuospatial Tetris Versus Verbal Pub Quiz, 10 PLoS One 1 (2010).  
24 E.A. Holmes et al., Key Steps In Developing a Cognitive Vaccine Against Traumatic 
Flashbacks: Visuospatial Tetris Versus Verbal Pub Quiz, 10 PLoS One 1, 5 (2010). 
25  J-O Ottosson, Experimental studies of memory impairment after electroconvulsive 
therapy, 35 Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 103 (1960) [READ]  
26 A.B. Donahue, Electroconvulsive therapy and memory loss: A personal journey, 16 
Journal of ECT 133 (2000). 
27 Stephen Maren Seeking a Spotless Mind: Extinction, Deconsolidation, and Erasure of 
Fear Memory, 70 Neuron 830, 836 (2011).  
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hired the company to erase their memories of the relationship. Selective 
erasure of entire memories enabled them to forget the existence of the other 
person.  
 Modern neuroscience has ushered in more discriminating ways to 
change our brains. Novel techniques enable us to dampen or eliminate the 
emotional charge and trauma of a memory while remembering the literal 
facts of the experience itself. In other words, it is possible to leave 
declarative memory—that is, the factual content associated with the 
memory—intact. But the emotional content associated with that memory is 
lessened or entirely extinguished.28  
 There are consequences to memory of doing so. Reducing the 
emotional charge associated with the declarative memory might also 
weaken the strength of the declarative memory itself. The strength—and 
therefore the long-term accuracy—of memories are enhanced when 
emotional stimuli accompanying that memory is consolidated along with it, 
and diminished when it is extinguished.  But weakened declarative memory 
is just one of the many consequences to changing our minds. Our individual 
identities and societal norms are challenged by these changes. The ability to 
selectively shape and change the brain opens Pandora’s Box of legal, 
ethical, and social concerns.  
II. A DUTY TO AVOID PAIN AND SUFFERING? 
The legal obligation to mitigate one’s own damages has normative 
underpinnings. Society benefits from decreasing the cost of accidents, and 
injured individuals are often in the best position to avert the aggravation of 
their injuries. The rules for awarding damages, therefore, are designed to 
discourage even those who have suffered loss at the hands of another from 
passively suffering such losses if they can be averted by reasonable 
efforts.29 Does this same rationale hold true when invisible injuries such as 
emotional pain and suffering are at stake? Is society also better off by 
having victims of tortious wrongdoing blunt their own emotional suffering? 
Will choosing an unmitigated mind hereinafter result in lesser damages 
rewarded to victims in civil cases? 
[[The doctrine of mitigation of damages in tort law, known also as the 
"avoidable consequences" doctrine, is an established principle in the 
common law of damages. The doctrine states that a defendant is not liable 
towards a plaintiff for any loss resulting from the defendant's wrongdoing if 
the plaintiff could and should have avoided that loss.  The plaintiff has the 
right to demand reimbursement for any reasonable cost incurred while 
                                                
28  See Lars Schwabe & Oliver T. Wolf, New Episodic Learning Interferes with the 
Reconsolidation of Autobiographical Memories, 4 PLOS ONE  e7519 (2009). 
29 Avoidable Consequences in Disability Insurance, Newark L. Rev. 8, 13-14. 
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attempting to mitigate. But if the plaintiff successfully mitigates her losses, 
then the damages should be reduced accordingly.]]30 
[[The mitigation of damages impose a moral duty to take reasonable 
steps to protect one's own welfare, even when the source of the risk is the 
unlawful or unreasonable conduct of another person. In order to encourage 
people to abide by this perceived moral duty, the common law attached a 
severe legal sanction, namely, the rule denying plaintiffs any right to 
demand compensation for harm which they could have and should have 
avoided had they followed the imperative of self-protection or self-
preservation. As tort scholars have noted, the moral justification for this 
demanding approach towards potential victims is far from obvious.80 There 
seems to be a consensus that the best explanation is provided by two 
interconnected moral ideas stemming from the individualistic philosophy 
which dominated legal thought throughout most of the nineteenth 
century.81]] 
A.  [Discussion of Tort Cases and the Interesting Divide Between 
Mitigating Physical Injuries and Mitigating “Invisible” Injuries”] 
***[In re Air Crash Disaster at Charlotte, N.C., 982 F.Supp. 1101 (D.S.C. 
1997): plaintiff flight attendant survived a commercial airline crash and 
sued the United States under Federal Tort Claims Act to recover for 
physical and emotional injuries, including a reduction in earning capacity 
and expenses for continued treatment of PTSD and related symptoms.  The 
defendant argued that the plaintiff's choice not to take antidepressant 
medications constituted a failure to the mitigate the PTSD-related damages 
he sought.   
 
The court held that "[plaintiff's] choice not to take antidepressant 
medications is not a wholly unreasonable choice. He has, instead, made 
major efforts in other ways and obviously declined the reliance on 
medication based on the same attitude of self-reliance and determination 
that have brought him this far in his recovery. Therefore, the court does not 
find this personal choice to be a failure to mitigate damages under the 
present circumstances." 
 
Commentators have noted that "[d]espite the fact that courts 
increasingly are willing to rely on psychological testimony to establish 
emotional distress damages (in the absence of physical impact), cases in 
which damages for emotional distress are limited because the plaintiff 
failed to minimize damages are few and far between." Kevin C. Klein & G. 
                                                
30 HARVEY MCGREGOR, MCGREGOR ON DAMAGES 235-236 (18th ed., 2009); 1 
CHITTY ON CONTRACTS, 1478-1479 (Hugh G. Beale Gen. ed., 29th ed. 2004).   
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Nicole Hininger, Mitigation of Psychological Damages: An Economic 
Analysis of the Avoidable Consequences Doctrine and Its Applicability to 
Emotional Distress Injuries, 29 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 405 (2004); but 
compare Noah, Comfortably Numb: Medicalizing (and Mitigating) Pain-
and-Suffering Damages, 42 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 431 (2009) (claiming 
that Klein and Hininger were overstating the degree of judicial hostility to 
the idea of extending the mitigation rule to emotional harms).]*** 
 
 
III. THE UNMITIGATED MIND 
A. Pain Cases 
B. PTSD Cases 
C. Depression Cases 
 
IV. COGNITIVE LIBERTY IN MODERN LEGAL DEBATES 
 The ability to change our brains enables us to shape our own life 
experiences. But so, too, can others through modern neuroscience. The 
brain changes and can be changed, so we must collectively decide whether 
to limit access to or alteration of the human brain.  
Cognitive liberty is a value that encompasses our personal interests 
over our own brains. It includes the freedom of thought and rumination, 
freedom of self-access, self-alteration, and self-determination, and 
autonomy calling for individual consent to changing the brain.  
[[The brain has been called the “secular equivalent of the soul.”31 Our 
very experience of self coincides with brain physiology. Our genes, our 
environment—the foods we eat, our social interactions, the weather, our 
education, and so on—all influence our personalities and identities. But 
even Francis Crick, the co-founder of the double-helix structure of DNA 
that he called the “code for life,” has acknowledged that our feelings, joys, 
aches, dreams, and wishes are reflected in the physiological activity of our 
brains.32]] 
 
                                                
31 James J. Giordano & Bert Gordijn, Scientific and Philosophical Perspective in 
Neuroethics 256 (2010). 
32 Francis Crick, The Astonishing Hypothesis: The Scientific Search for the Soul 
(1995). 
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A. Accessing the Mind 
a. Passwords and Employers 
[Current state employment and education law, or rather lack thereof, in the 
overwhelming majority of states has allowed employers and academic 
institutions to demand social media account passwords of both current and 
prospective employees and students. However, the trend of legislation 
implies a relatively quick resolution in favor of protecting the employees’ 
and students’ personal information.  In 2012, four states passed legislation 
prohibiting employers from requesting current and prospective employee’s 
social media account passwords.33 Four states also passed similar statutes 
for academic institutions,34 and ten other states introduced legislation that 
would have prohibited employers or academic institutions from doing the 
same.35].  
b. Absolute Judicial Deliberative Privilege 
[In re Enforcement of Subpoena, 463 Mass. 162 (2012). The privilege 
they announced was absolute, covering a “judge’s mental impressions and 
thought processes in reaching a judicial decision, whether harbored 
internally or memorialized in other non-public materials.” It did not bar an 
inquiry into the judge’s work, what was said in open court or related in 
decisions.  It only banned an inquiry into what was in the judge’s mind 
when she made her decision.] 
B. Changing the Mind 
 
a. Forcible Competency 
Text text text text text text text text text text text text text text text 
text text text text text text text text text text text text.  
                                                
33 CAL. LAB. CODE § 980 (West 2013); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 55/10 (West 2013); 
MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 
3–712 (West 2013); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.271 (West 2013). 
34 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 99120 (West 2013); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14 § 9401 (West 
2013); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 
37.271 (West 2013); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:3-29 (West 2013). 
35  Employer Access to Social Media Usernames and Passwords: 2012 Legislation, 
NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Jan. 17, 2013), 
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/telecom/employer-access-to-social-media- 
passwords.aspx (Delaware, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New 
York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Washington).  None were voted down.  
Id. 
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b. Confronting Erased Memories 
[Most courts have held that the Confrontation Clause right is satisfied 
even if the witness has no recollection of the events in their testimony.36 
The main Supreme Court case on this is U.S. v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 559 
(1988), which held that the Confrontation Clause was not violated even 
though the witness was unable to explain the basis for her past 
identification of the defendant, because the defendant received an adequate 
opportunity to probe witness's memory loss. Most Circuit Court cases have 
read Owens as holding that the mere opportunity to question the witness, 
even if the witness has no memory of the testimony, satisfies the 
confrontation requirement.37 Hypnotically refreshed testimony, where the 
witness could not recall the testimony until placed under hypnosis, does not 
violate the confrontation clause as long as the defendant is permitted to test 
the reliability of the testimony by cross-examination.38 Even the testimony 
of a witness with multiple personality disorder has generally been held to 
satisfy the Confrontation Clause as long as the defendant is given an 
opportunity to cross-examine the personality who provided the earlier 
testimony.39 
There are, however, some cases that suggest that the mere physical 
presence of the witness is not sufficient to satisfy the confrontation 
requirement. United States v. DiCaro, 772 F.2d 1314, 1323 (7th Cir. 1985) 
stated in dicta that “a witness's total amnesia concerning a prior statement 
will often make him not subject to cross-examination” and so will mean 
that introduction of the statement violates the Confrontation Clause. In 
United States v. Spotted War Bonnet, 933 F.2d 1471, 1474 (8th Cir. 1991), 
the Eighth Circuit stated in dicta that where a witness “is so young that she 
cannot be cross-examined at all, or if she is simply too young and too 
frightened to be subject to a thorough direct or cross-examination,” her 
mere physical presence will not satisfy the confrontation requirement. 
Further, in Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court held that “[T]he 
[Confrontation] Clause does not bar admission of a statement so long as the 
declarant is present at trial to defend or explain it.”40 This statement in 
Crawford at first blush suggests that where the declarant is present but 
unable to defend or explain her past statements, they may be inadmissible 
under the Confrontation Clause.  
                                                
 
 South Carolina, and Washington).  None were voted down.  Id. 
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However, in United States v. Cookson, 556 F.3d 647, 651-52 (2009), 
the Seventh Circuit held that it did not violate the Confrontation Clause, 
even after Crawford, to introduce the testimony of a witness who did not 
recall either the substance of her past statements or even her making the 
statements introduced. The Seventh Circuit held in Cookson that DiCaro, 
supra, is inconsistent with Owens and Keeter, and that Spotted War Bonnet 
was inapplicable to the facts because the witness, while she could not 
remember her past testimony, was not too afraid or young to be cross-
examined. Cookson suggests that testimonial evidence obtained via 
neuroimaging may be admissible even from a witness who does not 
remember the evidence in question, as long as that witness is physically 
available for cross-examination. Most other cases I could find, including 
cases from state supreme courts where the Supreme Court denied certiorari 
on appeal, read Crawford’s “defend or explain” language as not reversing 
the Owens rule that an opportunity to cross-examine meets the 
confrontation requirement even in the case of a witness who cannot 
remember either the content of her past statements or the event of her 
making them.41  Only a few cases or opinions read that language as 
implying that a witness who cannot remember her past statements does not 
satisfy the confrontation requirement; these opinions generally lack 
precedential value.42 Ultimately, Keeter’s reading of the Confrontation 
Clause right seems to accurately capture the current state of the law: “The 
Supreme Court's point was that the confrontation clause (and the rule) are 
satisfied when the witness must look the accused in the eye in court.”43] 
CONCLUSION 
 
                                                
 
 
 
